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MANY MINDS, MANY MDL JUDGES
BRIAN T. FITZPATRICK*
I
INTRODUCTION
Over his long career, Francis McGovern was a leading supporter of
decentralizing the fact finding that goes on in multidistrict litigation (MDL). His
advocacy of letting torts “mature” gave rise to the sampling that takes place in
today’s bellwether jury system.1 More recently, he advocated selective remands
of cases from MDLs to other judges so the litigation could proceed in parallel
before multiple judges rather than serially before one.2 In this Article, I try to
formalize and extend the intuition behind McGovern’s ideas and ask why, if
decentralization is good for fact finding, is it not also good for the legal
decisionmaking that takes place in MDLs? My answer is that decentralization is
indeed just as good on the legal side. I therefore analyze two ideas for how we
might capture the benefits of decentralized legal decisionmaking without
incurring too many costs.
This is an important matter because the federal MDL statute3 now
concentrates more power in the hands of a single person than perhaps any other
part of our judicial system. A single judge can end up resolving hundreds,
thousands, or even hundreds of thousands of individually viable cases. This has
benefits—most notably efficient case processing, uniformity of results, and the
facilitation of global peace—but it also has costs.
My focus here is on a cost that has been surprisingly neglected by scholars but
may be the greatest cost of them all: the accurate adjudication of legal claims and
defenses. I suspect it is intuitive to most of us that asking one person to decide
something instead of inviting many other people to weigh in probably reduces
the quality of the resulting decision. There is a literature that formalizes this
intuition called “many-minds” scholarship. It proceeds from a famous
mathematics proof known as the Condorcet Jury Theorem. Although some
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1. See Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. REV. 659, 694
(1989) (discussing “new mass tort-specific dispute resolution procedures”).
2. See Francis E. McGovern, Toward a Cooperative Strategy for Federal and State Judges in Mass
Tort Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1867, 1892 (2000) (“[T]he MDL judge would remand a limited number
of cases to federal and state courts for trial with a sound methodology of case selection, creating a more
representative marketplace of litigation . . . .”).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1407.

07_FITZPATRICK (DO NOT DELETE)

108

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

6/29/2021 1:49 PM

[Vol. 84:107

people have questioned the applicability of many-minds theories to legal
decisionmaking, if there were ever a legal context in which they could be
applicable, I argue it is in the context of our MDL system.
If we find this literature persuasive, how can we bring more minds to bear on
the legal questions in MDLs without undoing too many of the benefits of
consolidation? Although I cannot undertake a full cost-benefit analysis here, I
sketch out a partial analysis for two ideas: (1) more appellate review of decisions
by MDL judges and (2) assigning MDLs to panels of judges instead of just one.
The first idea fares worse on a cost-benefit analysis because appeals are
sequential and take so long to resolve. Moreover, commentators have discussed
increasing appellate review for many years and it has thus far been difficult to
implement. Not only would it require lawmaking, but the contours of the
proposal have been hard to write down on paper. I argue that these
considerations make the second idea more appealing. Yet, it has received very
little scholarly attention and requires no change in the law to implement.
II
THE CONCENTRATED POWER OF MDL JUDGES
Let me begin by explaining why our MDL system concentrates judicial power
to an extent that perhaps no other corner of our justice system does. Under the
MDL statute, a panel of federal judges called the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation (JPML) can transfer all of the cases in the federal system with even a
single factual question in common to one district court judge for resolution of all
the pretrial matters in those cases.4 This is often only dozens or hundreds of cases,
but sometimes it is thousands, tens of thousands, or even hundreds of thousands
of cases.5 All to one judge. Those cases would have been handled by dozens or
even hundreds of other judges.
Although the statute directs MDL judges to decide only pretrial matters, this
is, as we know, ninety-nine percent of modern litigation. Pretrial matters include
motions to dismiss, motions for summary judgment, motions to exclude experts,
motions to exclude other evidence, motions for class certification, and many,
many other decisions.6 But MDL judges often resolve matters at trial as well.
Although their ability to preside over trials is limited, there are ways around these
limits and MDL judges take advantage of them.7 But most of the time the MDL
enters into some sort of mass-settlement well before any, or at least many, of its
cases are remanded to their original courts for a trial in any event.8 Moreover,
even on the rare occasions when cases are remanded back to their original courts,
4. Id.
5. Margaret S. Williams, The Effect of Multidistrict Litigation on the Federal Judiciary over the Past
50 Years, 53 GA. L. REV. 1245, 1246 (2019).
6. ROBERT H. KLONOFF, FEDERAL MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION IN A NUTSHELL 197 (2020).
7. See id. at 327–30 (describing the ways MDL judges can preside over trials despite Lexecon Inc.
v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998)).
8. Id. at 197 (“[O]nly about three percent of MDL cases get remanded to the transferor courts.”).
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the pretrial decisions made by the MDL judge are insulated from reconsideration
through the law-of-the-case doctrine.9 For all these reasons, the MDL judge
usually makes not just ninety-nine percent of decisions in all the cases transferred
to it, but one hundred percent of the decisions.
One might think the MDL judge’s hold on the litigation could be tempered
by appellate review, but this too is hard to come by. Pretrial decisions are usually
not appealable on account of the final judgment rule.10 Interlocutory review by
certification11 or mandamus12 is, by design, infrequent.13 Thus, for all practical
purposes, the decisions of the single MDL judge are usually the only decisions
any federal judge at any level will render in MDL cases.
In MDLs based on diversity subject matter jurisdiction, there are sometimes
cases in state courts that cannot be removed to federal court.14 These cases
temper the exclusive hold of the MDL judge over the decisions that arise in the
litigation. These cases are therefore exceptions to the general rule I described in
this Part. Nonetheless, many commentators want to stamp out these exceptions
and bring them, too, into the MDL judge’s fold.15
I believe these commentators are misguided if we are concerned, as we should
be, about accurate decisionmaking in MDLs. Rather, we should build on the state
court orphans by finding ways to involve more judges, not fewer, in MDL cases.
III
MANY-MINDS THEORIES AND LEGAL DECISIONMAKING
Concentrating decisionmaking in the hands of one person has undoubted
benefits. Most notably, it is much more efficient for one judge to process
thousands of similar cases than for hundreds of judges to have to do so. As
Andrew Bradt has expertly chronicled, the political constituency for the MDL
statute was federal judges rather than litigants; protecting their dockets from
being overwhelmed by too many cases was the primary motivation for the

9. Id. at 333.
10. See id. at 310–12 (discussing the difficulty of appealing interlocutory orders).
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1651.
13. KLONOFF, supra note 6, at 248 (discussing a “defendant’s inability to obtain interlocutory
review”). But see Abbe R. Gluck, Unorthodox Civil Procedure: Modern Multidistrict Litigation’s Place in
the Textbook Understandings of Procedure, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1669, 1707 (2017) (“This is not to say there
are no MDL cases in the federal courts of appeals. A brief review, based on cases accessible in Westlaw,
reveals at least 100 MDL cases that reached the circuit courts on direct review over the past five years.”).
14. KLONOFF, supra note 6, at 335; DOUGLAS G. SMITH, THE RISING BEHEMOTH: MULTIDISTRICT
AND MASS TORT LITIGATION IN THE UNITED STATES 126–32 (2020). Sometimes the state court cases
outnumber the cases in the MDL. See KLONOFF, supra note 6, at 335 (highlighting examples).
15. See, e.g., KLONOFF, supra note 6, at 379 (describing a proposal that “would allow removal from
state court to federal court of a case not qualifying for diversity jurisdiction when: (1) the case arises from
the same transaction or occurrence (or series of transactions or occurrences) as a case in federal court;
and (2) the cases share a common factual or legal question”). Cf. Zachary D. Clopton & D. Theodore
Rave, MDL in the States, 115 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (advocating consolidation of state cases
to facilitate coordination with the MDL judge).
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statute.16 But there have been other benefits, too. One is uniformity: one judge
deciding all the cases means all the plaintiffs are treated the same—for better or
for worse.17 Moreover, concentration confers economies of scale not only to the
judiciary but to the litigants as well.18 This is most important for plaintiffs, as
concentration gives their lawyers the incentives and means to invest in the
litigation in the same way a defendant facing thousands of similar cases would
even without concentration.19 This should help improve the quality of the
resulting decisions in MDL litigation. But it is also important for defendants
because it eases resolution of the lawsuits that have been filed against them; with
only one set of lawyers to negotiate settlement with, they can more easily achieve
what is known as “global peace.”20
But concentration has many costs as well. Because other commentators have
discussed many of these costs, I will not repeat them here.21 Instead, I wish to
focus on something that has been surprisingly neglected by commentators even
though I think it may be the most significant cost of all: accurate adjudication.22
While concentrating cases in the hands of one judge can improve the quality of
decisionmaking by improving the plaintiffs’ presentation as I discussed above, it
16. Andrew D. Bradt, “A Radical Proposal”: The Multidistrict Litigation Act of 1968, 165 U. PA. L.
REV. 831 (2017).
17. See Jack B. Weinstein, Notes on Uniformity and Individuality in Mass Litigation, 64 DEPAUL L.
REV. 251, 254 (2015) (discussing the fact that uniformity ensures that all parties’ rights are equally
protected).
18. See Samuel Issacharoff & John Fabian Witt, The Inevitability of Aggregate Settlement: An
Institutional Account of American Tort Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1571, 1597 (2004) (discussing how
economies of scale help in “avoiding the multiplication of costs necessary to bring individual claims”).
19. See Andrew D. Bradt & D. Theodore Rave, It’s Good to Have the Haves on Your Side: A
Defense of Repeat Players in Multidistrict Litigation, 108 GEO. L.J. 73, 91 (2019) (“By aggregating their
claims, plaintiffs can pool resources, share risk, coordinate litigation strategy, disable holdouts, and
present a unified negotiating position—all things that offset some of the defendant’s repeat-player
advantage.”).
20. See Samuel Issacharoff & D. Theodore Rave, The BP Oil Spill Settlement and the Paradox of
Public Litigation, 74 La. L. Rev. 397, 413–18 (2014) (“Defendants in mass litigation want peace, and they
are often willing to pay [a premium] for it.”).
21. The most comprehensive treatment is Abbe R. Gluck & Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, MDL
Revolution, 96 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2021). See also, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Procedural Justice in
Nonclass Aggregation, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 54 (2009) (“This impulse toward efficiency . . . is
often at odds with procedural justice tenets.”); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Judging Multidistrict
Litigation, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 71, 76 (2015); Gluck, supra note 13, at 1669, 1670–74, 1693–94 (2017)
(noting that “MDL judges are particularly focused on efficiency” while “[s]cholars worry about lack of
transparency, loss of the individual claim, and the dearth of uniform procedural law”); Martin H. Redish
& Julie M. Karaba, One Size Doesn’t Fit All: Multidistrict Litigation, Due Process, and the Dangers of
Procedural Collectivism, 95 B.U. L. REV. 109, 149 (2015).
22. See Jonathan T. Molot, Litigation Finance: A Market Solution to A Procedural Problem, 99 Geo.
L.J. 65, 67 (2010) (“A principal goal of civil procedure—indeed, the principal goal—is the accurate
application of law to fact.”). The only commentators I have seen address this cost—albeit briefly—are
John Rabiej, Two Proposals to Improve How Courts Manage “Mega-MDLs,” 3 (George Washington
MDL Roundtable, April 27, 2017) (mentioning “questionable rulings”), Stephen A. Wood, Improving
Multidistrict Litigation: The Case for Three-Judge Panels 12 (Wash. Legal Found. Critical Legal Issues,
Working Paper No. 208, 2018) (mentioning “extreme, unusual, incorrect, or even unfair results”), and
SMITH, supra note 14, at 132–38 (discussing MDL participants’ dissatisfaction with a single
decisionmaker).

07_FITZPATRICK (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 2 2021]

6/29/2021 1:49 PM

MANY MINDS, MANY MDL JUDGES

111

can also undermine the quality of decisionmaking by cutting off second, third,
fourth, and fifth opinions before judges render final verdicts on matters that can
impact large numbers of people. I think this cost is intuitive, but, as I explain, the
many-minds literature has formalized the intuition. This literature has many
strands,23 but below, I focus on the two that I find most compelling because they
rely on simple mathematics: what I call “decisional” many-minds theory and
“statistical” many-minds theory.24
A. Decisional Many-Minds Theory
Decisional many-minds theory begins with something called the Condorcet
Jury Theorem. Using simple mathematics, the Marquis de Condorcet long ago
showed that, if we hold everything else constant, the more people we ask a
question, the greater the chance the majority of them will select the correct
answer. This holds if each person has a better than even chance at selecting the
correct answer on their own and if they make their selections at least somewhat
independently of one another.25 The Theorem has been extended in many ways
in the ensuing years. For example, not every person needs to be better than even
if the average of the group is better than even,26 and, although the Theorem was
based on questions that pose only a binary choice, it has been extended to a
plurality’s answer to multiple-choice questions.27 It works for both simultaneous
decisionmaking or sequential decisionmaking.28 Moreover, it does not depend in

23. For example, there are also strands based on the Hayekian virtues of evolutionary thought and
the Aristotelian virtues of deliberative thought. See ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW AND THE LIMITS OF
REASON 33–41 (2008) [hereinafter VERMEULE, LIMITS OF REASON]. The literature is most often
invoked in political science. See, e.g., David Estlund & Helene Landemore, The Epistemic Value of
Democratic Deliberation, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY (Andre
Bachtiger, et al., eds., 2018). But much of it was popularized in JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF
CROWDS (2004).
24. For one of the best discussions of the mathematical strands, see Paul H. Edelman, On Legal
Interpretations of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, 31 J. LEG. STUD. 327 (2002). He distinguishes between
the “polling” model, which is what I call statistical many-minds, and the “aggregation” model, which is
what I call decisional many-minds. See id. at 332–34.
25. People also have to answer sincerely and be personally unaffected by the outcome. CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA: HOW MANY MINDS PRODUCE KNOWLEDGE 25, 27–28 (2006); Hélène
Landemore, Democratic Reason: The Mechanisms of Collective Intelligence in Politics, in COLLECTIVE
WISDOM: PRINCIPLES AND MECHANISMS 251, 265 (Hélène Landemore & Jon Elster eds., 2012); Adrian
Vermeule, Collective Wisdom and Institutional Design, in COLLECTIVE WISDOM: PRINCIPLES AND
MECHANISMS 338, 344–45 (Hélène Landemore & Jon Elster eds., 2012) [hereinafter Vermeule,
Collective Wisdom]; VERMEULE, LIMITS OF REASON, supra note 23, at 28 (“The independence required
by the Jury Theorem is ‘statistical, not casual,’ meaning that so long as A’s vote is the same as A’s vote
conditional on B’s vote, statistical independence is preserved . . . .”).
26. Vermeule, Collective Wisdom, supra note 25, at 345.
27. See, e.g., Nicholas R. Miller, Information, Individual Errors, and Collective Performance:
Empirical Evidence on the Condorcet Jury Theorem, GROUP DECISION AND NEGOTIATION, 211, 213–
14 (1996).
28. Vermeule, Collective Wisdom, supra note 25, at 346. There is mixed evidence on whether
synchronism improves or hinders accurate decisionmaking. VERMEULE, LIMITS OF REASON, supra note
23, at 49–50.
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any way on deliberation among the persons answering the question;29 there are
some reasons to think that deliberation improves accuracy, but some reasons to
think that it does not.30
If everything else is not held constant, the Theorem does not hold. But that
could be either good or bad; that is, it is possible that a bigger group may perform
even better than Condorcet would have predicted if other factors weigh in that
direction. A nice statement of this comes from Adrian Vermeule, who
summarizes the probability that the majority of a group of people will select the
correct answer to a question as a function of three variables: the size of the group
(the more people the better), the average competence of the group (the more
competent the better), and the diversity within the group (the more diversity—
that is, uncorrelated or negatively correlated errors—the better).31 In other
words, increasing the number of decisionmakers should improve the accuracy of
the decision so long as average competence improves or at least does not fall and
diversity improves or at least does not decline. As I explain below, I believe that
is precisely what would happen if we increased the number of judicial minds
involved in MDLs .
It is important to note that the Condorcet Theorem and its subsequent
extensions depend on an exogenously correct answer to the question put to the
group.32 That is, there must be some truth that we are pursuing. This applies easily
to factual questions—even if it may be difficult to figure out what the correct
answers are—because factual questions are essentially empirical questions: what
happened on such date at such and such place. But juries (if we get that far)
resolve factual questions in MDL cases; the questions answered by MDL judges
are legal questions. It is harder to see how legal questions can have correct
answers because they are a matter of interpretation: judges are free to use
different interpretative methods and, even when they use the same method, every
method is indeterminate to at least some extent. Nonetheless, most people seem
to agree there are at least some legal questions that have determinate answers.33
If that is true, then it is not so important to try to figure out how many legal
questions have determinate answers—at this at this point, anyway; it may affect

29. VERMEULE, LIMITS OF REASON, supra note 23, at 37 (“[T]he Jury Theorem is a statistical
mechanism that can go through whether or not the participants talk to each other . . . .”).
30. SUNSTEIN, supra note 25, at 57–64; Vermeule, Collective Wisdom, supra note 25, at 348; Dan
Sperger & Hugo Mercier, Reasoning as a Social Competence, in COLLECTIVE WISDOM: PRINCIPLES AND
MECHANISMS 368–86 (2012) (endorsing group deliberation); VERMEULE, LIMITS OF REASON, supra
note 23, at 36–41, 73–75 (noting the danger of “information cascades”).
31. Vermeule, Collective Wisdom, supra note 25, at 346; see also id. at 56–70, 269, 354 (discussing
diversity as lack of error correlation); VERMEULE, LIMITS OF REASON, supra note 23, at 78 (same).
32. See, e.g., Vermeule, Collective Wisdom, supra note 25, at 342–43 (discussing “epistemic
accuracy” and “truth-tracking capacity”).
33. VERMEULE, LIMITS OF REASON, supra note 23, at 8, 67 (“I will assume that there is a truth that
legal institutions can track—that there are exogenously defined right answers to the relevant legal
questions. [A]lthough this is an assumption . . . it is also a substantively plausible assumption . . . .”).
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the cost-benefit analysis I undertake in Part IV.34 So long as we assume that there
are some questions presented to MDL judges that have correct answers, then
decisional many-minds theory can tell us something about the best way to find
the answers to those questions.
B. Statistical Many-Minds Theory
But even if you don’t believe legal questions can ever have exogenously
correct answers, the statistical many-minds theory can still be applicable.
Statistical many-minds theory is not concerned with exogenously correct answers
but endogenously representative answers.35 That is, it seeks to improve the
likelihood that questions are answered with mainstream answers rather than
outlier answers; here, an accurate answer to a question might be the modal
answer that all possible decisionmakers would give.
It is easier to see that many of the questions that arise in MDLs can be more
or less accurate in this sense: for almost any question, we can imagine a range of
answers that would be given in the federal judiciary; some of those answers will
be more common and some of those answers will be less common. If the answer
is less common, it is less accurate in the simple sense that most judges would have
given a different answer.
The math behind statistical many-minds is little more than the familiar
mathematics of statistical sampling: the more minds we sample, the closer the
modal answer of the group gets to the modal answer that would be given by all
people.36 The theory works even if the sampling is done randomly, as it usually is
in statistics; we don’t have to worry about the average competence of the minds
sampled like we do with the decisional many-minds theory. For these reasons, it
will be even easier to see how increasing the number of judicial minds in MDL
litigation can improve statistical accuracy.
C. Many Minds and Legal Decisionmaking
It is not important which of these two many-minds theories you like better
because they both point in the same direction: the more minds, the better.37 Thus,
if you think either correct or representative legal decisions are both possible and
desirable, then many-minds theory has something to say about our MDL system.
Indeed, although the many-minds literature has never been applied to MDL
judges, it has been applied to legal decisionmaking many times over.38 There is
34. Vermuele, Collective Wisdom, supra note 25, at 339 (“These controversies affect the size of the
domain within which epistemic accuracy gets purchase but do not undermine the baseline conception
itself.”).
35. See id. at 342 (discussing representative answers).
36. See Edelman, supra note 24, at 342 (“The larger the panel, the more likely it is that the outcome
will be representative of the wishes of the judges in the circuit as a whole.”).
37. See id. at 334 (“[F]or numerical purposes, . . . these models lead to the same conclusions.”).
38. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, A CONSTITUTION OF MANY MINDS 9–10, 96–112, 166–184, 196–
209 (2009); VERMEULE, LIMITS OF REASON, supra note 23; Michael Abramowicz, En Banc Revisited,
100 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (2000); Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96
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nothing about the decisions that MDL judges face that suggests they would be
any less applicable.
It is true some scholars have been skeptical of applications of decisional
many-minds theory to legal decisionmaking. But in my view, the MDL system is
the ideal context for the decisional theory. For example, although skeptics
sometimes question whether any group of judges will have a better than even
chance at knowing the correct answer to a legal question, this skepticism is less
applicable to the MDL system than perhaps any other body of judges: not only
are federal judges our most talented judges, but, when the JPML picks among
them for MDL duty, the JPML seeks out the very best of the best.39 Other
skeptics note that there are diminishing returns to competence and diversity as
we add more judges to a group.40 But these concerns have little traction in the
MDL context: here, we are talking about increasing the number of judges from
one to more than one. There are not yet diminishing returns when we have only
barely begun the additive process. This feature of the current MDL system makes
it something of a paradigmatic example for the efficacy of many-minds theory.
As Professor Vermeule, who is perhaps the leading skeptic of decisional manyminds theory in law, has noted, the theory is at its apex when it is comparing one
mind to many.41
Professor Vermeule has cast special doubt on the applicability of decisional
many-minds theory when judges make decisions sequentially. Because later
judges may free ride off earlier decisions, average competence may not improve
while diversity—in the sense of independent error—may decrease.42 Much of his
concern is based on the legal imperative that later judges follow the precedents
set by earlier judges.43 But, in the ideas I examine below, precedent will be at its
weakest, to the extent it is relevant at all: the ideas involve either judges sitting
as a panel in the first instance or judges sitting as an appellate panel exercising de
YALE L.J. 82 (1986); William Ortman, Rulemaking’s Missing Tier, 68 ALA. L. REV. 225 (2016); Eric A.
Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Other States, 59 STAN. L. REV. 131 (2006); Maxwell L. Stearns,
The Condorcet Jury Theorem and Judicial Decisionmaking: A Reply to Saul Levmore, 3 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 125 (2002); Matthew C. Stephenson, Information Acquisition and Institutional Design, 124
HARV. L. REV. 1422 (2011). Less formal but similar ideas underlie the preference for letting legal issues
percolate before the Supreme Court reviews them. See, e.g., Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors:
Reforming the National Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV. 417, 420 (2017).
39. See KLONOFF, supra note 6, at 132 (“Some academics and MDL judges believe that the Panel
tries to pick the best and brightest judges to serve as MDL judges.”).
40. VERMEULE, LIMITS OF REASON, supra note 23, at 13 (“[M]ore heads can actually be worse than
fewer; adding imperfect epistemic agents to the system might not merely produce diminishing returns, it
might actually reduce the system’s epistemic quality.”).
41. Id. at 53–54 (“Even if one-many comparisons of this sort succeed, the legal system typically
presents a very different type of issue: many-many comparisons, in which institutions staffed by many
minds are on both sides . . . .”).
42. Id. at 44, 46–47, 73–75. Many of these points are also made by Stephenson, supra note 38.
43. He calls this the “Burkean paradox”: more judges add more value by giving independent
answers, but the common-law method forces them to follow the answers of others. VERMEULE, LIMITS
OF REASON, supra note 23, at 46, 75–76. See also Stearns, supra note 38, at 128–29 (“[W]e cannot know
with certainty whether like outcomes are the product of independent reflection or, instead, an
endogenous function of the operation of precedent itself.”).
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novo review. Although free riding is still possible, it is certainly not required or
encouraged in the way it was in Professor Vermeule’s discussion of the common
law.
But it is important to emphasize that none of these skepticisms and none of
these caveats apply to statistical many-minds theory. As I noted above, we can
pick judges at random and the group’s modal answer will still get closer and closer
to the modal answer of all judges as the size of the group increases. This is true
even if the judges’ decisions are not entirely independent of one another. Hence,
there is little reason to doubt the applicability of statistical many minds to the
ideas explored below.
D. Empirical Evidence for Many Minds in MDLs?
Although these many-minds theories are only theories, I find them
particularly compelling because they depend on little more than simple
mathematics. But it is of course impossible for me to prove empirically that our
MDL judges are rendering less accurate decisions than they would in an
alternative system; there is no alternative system in place to which the current
system may be compared. Nonetheless, I think it is fair to ask whether I have any
examples of decisions made by MDL judges that might have been different had
they enjoyed the benefit of more minds. Identifying decisions that could have
been improved according to the decisional model would require me to look
deeply into the merits of rulings, which I do not have the capacity to do for this
Article. Moreover, I am even reluctant to try to identify decisions that could have
been improved in the endogenous-statistical sense without collecting data on how
other judges have looked at the same questions. But it is no secret that different
MDL judges can rule quite differently on the similar matters. Other scholars have
chronicled many of these differences.44 Surely some of these decisions would have
come out otherwise had these judges been able to weigh in on each other’s cases
rather than render their decisions in isolation.
IV
IMPLEMENTING MANY MINDS IN MDLS
If you agree that it might be beneficial to increase the number of judicial
minds in MDL litigation, is there a way to do it without significantly undermining
the benefits of consolidation? I think so. As I noted, Professor McGovern favored
earlier and more frequent remands of cases from MDL judges back to their
original judges, advice that Judge Polster followed in the In re National

44. See, e.g., KLONOFF, supra note 6, at 208–17 (discussing conflicting decisions over the
admissibility of experts, preemption, and summary judgment); Diego A. Zambrano, How Litigation
Imports Foreign Regulation, 107 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (discussing conflicting decisions over
discoverability and admissibility of foreign regulatory information).
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Prescription Opiate Litigation.45 Although I, too, like this idea, it is unclear how
many cases it can realistically free from the clutches of MDL judges, especially
given that it depends upon the cooperation of those very MDL Judges who must
agree to remand the cases.46 Instead, I consider below two more systematic
proposals: (1) more appellate review of decisions by MDL judges and (2)
assigning MDLs to panels of judges instead of just one.
A. Increased Appellate Review of MDL Decisions
Scholars and other commentators have long debated increasing the
opportunities for parties in an MDL to appeal the decisions of the MDL judge.47
There is little doubt that both statistical and even decisional many-minds would
predict that this would improve accuracy: instead of one judge deciding nearly
everything, four judges (the district court and a panel of three appellate judges)
would decide some things (more on the some below); quadrupling the number of
minds also necessarily improves diversity; and there would be no reason to think
average competency would fall.
But it is important to note that this may not be as big an improvement as it
might appear at first blush. Because three of the judges will sit as a panel, we have
to be concerned with more free riding among them than if they were deciding on
their own.48 Moreover, members of panels sometimes go along with their
colleagues for reasons of collegiality.49 As I noted above, the record on
deliberation is mixed at best. Thus, although adding appellate review should
improve accuracy on net, the panel format probably misses some of the potential
many-minds gain.
Moreover, this proposal will improve accuracy only for the decisions that we
allow the parties to appeal. How many will those be? Presumably only a small
minority of the decisions made by the MDL judge, lest we let MDLs mire in
appeals like a Dickens novel.50 Although we might permit appeals from the most
important decisions the MDL judge makes (more on that below), because this
45. MDL No. 2804, 2020 WL 582151, at *3 (J.P.M.L. Feb. 5, 2020); Jeff Overley, Opioid MDL Judge
Picks New Bellwethers, Denies Retaliating, Law360 (April 7, 2021) (remanding for trial five bellwethers
to five different judges, in five different districts, in five different states, in five different Circuits).
See also Rabiej, supra note 22, at 4–5 (endorsing this idea).
46. See KLONOFF, supra note 6, at 330 (citing J.P.M.L. Rule 10.3(a)) (“The JPML rules note that
‘the Panel is reluctant to order a remand absent the suggestion of the transferee judge.’”).
47. See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 14, at 146–49 (endorsing more opportunities for appellate review);
Joshua P. Davis & Brian J. Devine, Procedural Self-Inflicted Wounds?, 24 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 497,
506 (2020) (arguing that expansion of appellate review would not serve asserted policy goals of its
proponents); David L. Noll, MDL as Public Administration, 118 MICH. L. REV. 403, 464 (2019)
(advocating appeal to three-judge panels comprised of district court judges).
48. VERMEULE, LIMITS OF REASON, supra note 23, at 88 (noting that when “each judge [is a] pivotal
voter, the incentive to acquire information is greater, and it is easier [to avoid] free-riders”).
49. See Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 151 U. PA. L.
REV. 1639, 1653 (2003) (“[T]he internal dynamics of the panel may lead judges to compromise their
ideological preferences to maximize ‘strategic’ goals—such as being in the majority, influencing the
content of the majority opinion, avoiding writing a dissent, or building capital for future cases.”).
50. See e.g., CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE (LONDON, BRADBURY & EVANS 1853).
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will still leave plenty of things unreviewed, we are again achieving only a fraction
of the potential gain of increasing the number of judicial minds.
But it gets even worse: against this very modest accuracy benefit comes a very
considerable cost to efficiency. Because appeals happen sequentially, every time
we allow a party to take one, the litigation is prolonged. That is, the more we gain
in accuracy by permitting more appeals, the more we will lose in efficiency.
Indeed, the average time to resolve an appeal is roughly a year in most circuits,
and as much as two years in some circuits;51 if we allowed each party to appeal
more than once, the length of an MDL would automatically double.52 It is not
clear that the modest gains to accuracy will outweigh these considerable costs to
efficiency.
Finally, this proposal comes with two major practical impediments: deciding
which appeals to allow and enacting the proposal in whatever form we decide is
best. With regard to the first impediment, it is difficult to capture on paper what
will be the most important decisions made by MDL judges. Commentators have
proposed various lists,53 but they all seem over- or underinclusive in foreseeable
ways, let alone in all the unforeseeable ones. One way to avoid specifying a list
of important decisions in advance is to permit each side to take a limited number
of appeals whenever they choose; something like the system professional football
coaches use when they want to challenge decisions made by referees by appealing
to instant replay.54 Although I prefer privately-ordered solutions of this sort to
centrally-decreed solutions like trying to divine a list in advance, it may be too
cute for serious consideration by lawmakers.
This brings me to the second impediment: expanding appellate opportunities
requires lawmaking. Either Congress or the Judicial Conference’s Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure would have to legislate the change, and, in light
of the fact that any change is thought to aid MDL defendants more than MDL

51. U.S. COURTS, U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS––MEDIAN TIME INTERVALS IN MONTHS FOR CIVIL
AND CRIMINAL APPEALS TERMINATED ON THE MERITS, BY CIRCUIT, DURING THE 12-MONTH
PERIOD ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2017 2 (2017), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_
tables/jb_b4a_0930.2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/F52J-WKR6].
52. See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch & Margaret S. Williams, Judicial Adjuncts in Multidistrict
Litigation, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 2129, 2148 (2020) (“[Products liability p]roceedings were open an
average of 1,743 days (4.7 years), with a minimum of 202 days . . . and a maximum of 4,964 days . . . .”).
53. See, e.g., LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, MDL PRACTICES AND THE NEED FOR FRCP
AMENDMENTS: PROPOSALS FOR DISCUSSION WITH THE MDL/TPLF SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 5 (2018), https://www.lfcj.com/uploads/1/1/2/0/112061707/
lcj_memo_-_mdl__tplf_proposals_for_discussion_9-14-18__004_.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z79K-DPZF]
(discussing which decisions should be subject to appellate review).
54. See Kenneth K. Kilbert, Instant Replay and Interlocutory Appeals, 69 BAYLOR L. REV. 267, 269
(2017) (arguing for each side in a case to be given one “challenge appeal”); see also Bryan Lammon,
Three Ideas for Discretionary Appeals, 53 AKRON L. REV. 639, 652–53 (2019) (arguing for each side in a
case to have only one opportunity to petition for discretionary appeal).
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plaintiffs,55 it is difficult to see how change advances in either venue; indeed, the
rulemaking committee very recently declined to move forward with the idea.56
B. MDL Panels
Wouldn’t it be nice if there was a many-minds improvement that could be
implemented without lawmaking? There is: assigning MDLs to panels of judges.
Although this idea has received much less attention than expanding appellate
review,57 existing law already permits it because the MDL statute says the JPML
can transfer multidistrict litigation to “a judge or judges.”58 Indeed, on rare
occasions, the JPML has done just that: I know of two instances where the
JPML—albeit in its earliest days—transferred litigation to a two-judge panel.59
Is the right size for the panel only two judges? Although we usually use threejudge district court panels,60 there is no reason it cannot be two or many more
than two; courts of last resort like the U.S. Supreme Court sit with many more
judges. Laboratory experiments outside of legal decisionmaking have found
diminishing returns to accuracy after somewhere between three and six people
have been consulted,61 but this is something the JPML could experiment with. So
long as the judges on the panel make their decisions jointly like any other multijudge panel rather than dividing the issues in the MDL among themselves—the
accuracy gains from many minds comes from redundant decisionmaking; as I
noted above, we want more minds thinking about the same question—then the
panel should make more accurate decisions than a single judge
The cost to efficiency would be negligible for the parties: cases wouldn’t take
any longer and they wouldn’t have to do any more work; they would make the
same motions and attend the same hearings that they do now. The cost to
efficiency for the judiciary would not be negligible because now multiple judges
are consumed by an MDL rather than just one.62 But this cost strikes me as a very
55. See KLONOFF, supra note 6, at 353 (“For the most part, plaintiffs’ attorneys . . . have not urged
MDL reform.”).
56. COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF
THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 28–29 (May 27,
2020), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/advisory_committee_on_civil_rules__may_2020_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/S5EA-GGDB].
57. The only example I am aware of is Wood, supra note 22, at 9. But weaker versions of this idea
might include the growing use of special masters by MDL judges, see Burch & Williams, supra note 52,
and the informal coordination between MDL judges and state judges that sometimes takes place, see
KLONOFF, supra note 6, at 337.
58. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (emphasis added).
59. See Order Reassigning Litigation to Judges Pierson M. Hall and Manuel Real, In re Air Crash
Disaster Near Papeete, Tahiti, on July 22, 1973 (J.P.M.L. 1979) (No. 206); see also In re Air Crash Disaster
Near Chicago, Ill., on May 25, 1979, 476 F. Supp. 445, 452 (J.P.M.L. 1979) (assigning the MDL to Judges
Edwin A. Robson and Hubert L. Will). Many thanks to Margaret Williams for these examples.
60. 28 U.S.C. § 2284.
61. Ilan Yaniv, The Benefit of Additional Opinions, 13 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCH. SCI. 75, 75
(2004) (explaining that in the domains of perception, general knowledge, business, and economics three
to six opinions are sufficient to realize accuracy gains).
62. See Wood, supra note 22, at 13.
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small price to pay if we can gain a more accurate adjudication of hundreds,
thousands, or even hundreds of thousands of legal claims and defenses that are
at issue in an MDL.
The accuracy gains will be much greater than in the appellate proposal
because, here, multiple minds will be deciding all questions rather than only the
small minority of questions that can be appealed. It is true that we still have to
worry about the diversity-sapping panel effects of free riding and collegiality, so
the accuracy gains will not be maximal, but, given the small price in efficiency,
this idea strikes me as a clear net improvement over the status quo.
Even so, this idea may not be suitable for every MDL. Although most of us
envision mass torts with thousands of cases when we conjure up images of MDLs
in our heads, the truth of the matter is that most MDLs are small affairs.63 If the
number of cases in an MDL is not numerous, it may not be worth drawing on
more judicial time to assign the litigation to a panel. Moreover, even when the
cases are numerous, it does not mean every MDL should receive a panel of the
same size: it might be worth assigning the biggest, so-called “mega” MDLs to
even larger panels because the accuracy gains given the number of cases might
be large enough to justify even more judicial time. Again, these are all questions
that the JPML has the freedom to experiment with under existing law.
V
CONCLUSION
Like other commentators, I think our MDL system has focused too singlemindedly on efficiency to the detriment of other procedural values.64 Unlike
other commentators, the procedural value that I worry has been most neglected
is what may be the most important one of them all: the accurate adjudication of
legal claims and defenses. One way to improve accuracy is to increase the number
of judges involved in MDLs . The best and easiest way to accomplish this may be
to assign MDLs to a panel of judges instead of just one judge. Unlike many
academic proposals, this requires no change in the law; the JPML has done it in
the distant past, and it could do it again.

63. See Williams, supra note 5, at 1275 (explaining that in 2011 “mega proceedings were not more
than 15% of all the proceedings created.”); see also Zachary D. Clopton, MDL as Category, 105
CORNELL L. REV. 1297, 1320 (2020) (“[M]ega-MDLs may not be representative of MDL litigation
overall.”).
64. See articles cited supra note 21.

